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FEATURE COMMENT: U.S. Government
To Award Billions Of Dollars In Contracts
To Open Electronic Marketplaces
To Government Customers—Though
Serious Questions Remain
Proposals to the U.S. General Services Administration are due soon in a $6 billion procurement under
which multiple no-cost contracts will be awarded to
vendors that will open electronic marketplaces to
federal users making micro-purchases (generally up
to $10,000). Although federal purchase card holders
have long been able to make micro-purchases with
few regulatory constraints regarding competition,
transparency or socioeconomic requirements, this
new initiative appears likely to normalize and expand those purchases—and so may revolutionize
small purchases in the federal market.
Launch of the Electronic Marketplaces
Initiative—The electronic marketplaces initiative launched with a mandate from Congress for
GSA to assess and use e-marketplaces in federal
procurement, under § 846 of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018,
P.L. 115-91. See Yukins, “Two U.S. Initiatives on
a Collision Course: Trump’s Buy American Order
and the New Electronic Marketplaces,” 6 Pub.
Proc. L. Rev. (Thomson Reuters, forthcoming 2019).
Congress called for action in part because Amazon
and other online vendors so dominate commercial
marketplaces. There seemed little reason for the
Government to be left behind, especially since
GSA’s own studies have shown that federal buyers
are already using Government-issued purchase
cards to make hundreds of millions of dollars in
4-215-510-0

© 2019 Thomson Reuters

purchases from online commercial marketplaces
every year.
The initial legislation prompted concern in the
federal procurement community, especially among
small businesses that feared being displaced by
large electronic marketplaces. Congress followed up
with § 838 of the NDAA for FY 2019, P.L. 115-232,
which bars misuse of sales data and is discussed
further below. Beyond minimal statutory guidance,
however, Congress has left it to GSA to develop the
electronic marketplaces, and—importantly—there
has been no new regulatory effort to shape these
billions of dollars in purchases.
It is difficult to gauge how large these electronic
marketplaces may grow. GSA believes that the electronic marketplaces will carry $6 billion in annual
sales, but that estimate may prove low. In FY 2014,
federal buyers made an estimated $17 billion in
micro-purchases, at a much lower micro-purchase
limit ($3,500 versus the current $10,000). See
Government Purchase Cards: Little Evidence of Potential Fraud Found in Small Purchases, But Documentation Issues Exist (GAO-17-276), available at
www.gao.gov/assets/690/682770.pdf. Moreover, because the electronic marketplaces will offer buyers
and sellers structured platforms with relatively few
requirements regarding transparency, competition
or accountability (discussed below), vendors may
crowd into the electronic marketplaces, and federal
purchasers may shift from other vehicles (such as
the GSA and Veterans Affairs schedule contracts,
currently a nearly $50 billion marketplace) for lowvalue sales. The new electronic marketplaces thus
may “swallow” a large portion of the bottom tiers of
the $550 billion federal market.
GSA’s Evolving Plans—In the initiative’s
first stage, in March 2018 GSA published a report
which explained three paths that the Government
could take to use e-marketplaces: the Government
could use existing commercial marketplaces (such
as Amazon.com or Walmart.com), the Government
could use the technology that powers those marketplaces (to enhance, for example, GSA’s unwieldy
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gsaadvantage.gov), or Government users could purchase directly from online vendors. See GSA, Procurement Through Commercial E-Commerce Portals
Implementation Plan, at 18 (March 2018), available at
interact.gsa.gov/blog/welcome-commercial-platforminitiative-group.
In a follow-up report in April 2019, GSA announced that it would follow the first option: to
contract with existing marketplaces (also known as
electronic “platforms,” or “e-platforms”). See GSA,
Procurement Through Commercial E-Commerce Portals—Phase II Report: Market Research & Consultation (April 2019) (GSA Phase II Report), available at
interact.gsa.gov/blog/welcome-commercial-platforminitiative-group. This approach—to use existing online marketplaces—holds substantial advantages for
GSA. It will allow GSA to collect a “referral” fee of .75
percent (or roughly $45 million in fees on $6 billion
in sales) for purchases by Government users through
the online marketplaces, while avoiding the costs and
risks of improving Government portals, or of relying
on transactions through individual vendors’ websites.
GSA’s plan has met with concerns from Capitol
Hill. In § 891 of the U.S. House of Representatives’
version of the pending NDAA for FY 2020, H.R.
2500 (passed by the House on July 12, 2019), and
in the House committee report which accompanied
that bill, H. Rep. No. 116-120, 116th Cong., 1st
Sess., pp.178–79 (June 19, 2019), the House Armed
Services Committee, concerned by objections to the
commercial marketplaces, called for GSA to revert
to an approach which would assess all three models
through pilots.
Nonetheless, GSA has proceeded with its pilot
initiative to award contracts for electronic marketplaces. GSA issued a draft request for proposals in
mid-2019, No. 47QSCC19R0429, and published a
final solicitation, No. 47QSCC20R0001 (available on
www.fbo.gov) for which proposals are due on Nov. 1,
2019. Under GSA’s final solicitation, multiple no-cost
contracts for three years (base plus two option years)
will be awarded to electronic marketplaces offering
diverse goods (and not services) that are commercial
off-the-shelf items. Like the draft GSA solicitation,
§ C.6 of the final GSA solicitation left open the possibility of reopening the competition later to admit
additional platforms. Per the Statement of Objectives
(SOO) of the final solicitation, any Government official holding GSA’s Government-wide purchase card
(which requires training and authorization, see, e.g.,
Federal Acquisition Regulation subpt. 13.3) will be
able to purchase through the electronic marketplaces.
2
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Concerns Under the Final Solicitation—As
noted, despite concerns about these new electronic
marketplaces, there has been no new regulatory effort
to guide this initiative. GSA has solicited public comments at several junctures, but those comments have
not formed a coherent, binding body of regulations to
govern this new multi-billion-dollar market. As a result, while the final solicitation followed the expected
trajectory—contracts will be awarded to vendors that
host commercial electronic marketplaces for micropurchases by federal users—GSA’s final solicitation
still left unresolved a number of concerns:
• Micro-Purchases May Climb Well Beyond
$10,000: While the solicitation states that the
new electronic marketplaces are to be used, at
least on a pilot basis, only for micro-purchases,
those purchases will not necessarily be limited
to the current general micro-purchase limit of
$10,000. E.g., FAR 2.101; William Clark, Chair,
Civilian Agency Acquisition Council, Memorandum for Civilian Agencies: Class Deviation
from the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
Increasing the Micro-Purchase Threshold
(Feb. 16, 2018). Micro-purchases for special
purposes—contingency operations abroad,
for example—can reach much higher levels,
see, e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Pricing and Contracting (DPC), Government
Purchase Card: Frequently Asked Questions
(summary table of micro-purchase thresholds
for Defense Department acquisitions), www.
acq.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/pc/faq.html; 61 GC
¶ 147, and GSA has urged Congress to increase
the standard micro-purchase limit to $25,000
for GSA-approved electronic portals, see GSA
Phase II Report, supra, at 4.
• No Mandates for Rigorous Competition or
Transparency: In accordance with FAR pt. 13’s
minimal requirements for micro-purchases,
GSA’s final solicitation does not require rigorous competition or transparency for orders
in the new electronic marketplaces. Instead,
without notice to the broader commercial
market, federal purchasers will only need to
review two competing items on the marketplaces, and will need to be able to document
that review (perhaps through something as
simple as a recorded “screen shot” of an offered
item). See SOO § 4.B. Users need not purchase
the least expensive item; indeed, the only pricing requirement is the cursory review of two
items. There will be no published notice of
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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the purchases, and there is no indication that
sales data (which might, for example, show
patterns of imprudently costly purchases),
though required for purchasers, agencies and
GSA, see SOO § 4.C, will be published outside
the Federal Government. As a practical matter,
the billions of taxpayer dollars spent through
the new marketplaces may prove to be largely
invisible to the taxpayers who contributed
those funds, and to the broader commercial
marketplace that might otherwise compete for
those purchases.
No Guarantee That Socio-Economic Goals
Will Be Met: Because of the way goods will be
bought in these new electronic marketplaces—
direct micro-purchases by Government users—
there will be little, if any, formal acquisition
planning process. Users will simply search,
click and buy. As a result, socio-economic goals
in procurement that normally are resolved in
the planning process—purchasing from small
or disadvantaged businesses, for example, or
accessibility requirements—may not be fully
addressed. Proponents of the new electronic
marketplaces may argue, though, that these
concerns are overstated, because only micropurchases will be made through these new
marketplaces, and micro-purchases are already
exempt from almost all procurement requirements, including socio-economic requirements.
See FAR 13.201(d). Proponents are also likely
to note that GSA’s final solicitation calls for
items on the marketplace to be identified and
searchable as eligible under special Government preferences (such as AbilityOne), see
SOO § 4.A, and AbilityOne items will not be
easily replaceable by “essentially the same”
items on the new platforms, see SOO § 4.B.
Those limited measures aside, however, individual Government purchasers ultimately will
be responsible for honoring these special preferences, per attachment 2 to the solicitation.
As a practical matter, therefore, as these new
electronic marketplaces gain momentum and
more small procurements shift to these vehicles, and as the centrifugal forces of the market
disperse purchasing authority to potentially
unaccountable individual users, regularized
purchases through the electronic marketplaces
may displace traditional purchases from small
and disadvantaged businesses, and other socioeconomic goals of the Federal Government
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in procurement—such as the accessibility of
information technology and environmental
sustainability—may lose traction.
No Domestic Content Requirements: Given the
Trump administration’s emphasis on “Buying
American,” one notable socio-economic casualty of the new marketplaces may be domestic
preferences. See, e.g., Yukins, Feature Comment, “Trump Executive Order Calls For More
Aggressive Use Of The Buy American Act—An
Order Likely To Have More Political Than
Practical Effect,” 61 GC ¶ 219. Because only
micro-purchases are allowed in the new marketplaces, and micro-purchases are exempt
from the Buy American Act, see FAR 13.201;
FAR 25.100, and generally fall anyway below
the Trade Agreements Act monetary thresholds, see FAR 25.402, it appears that none of
the normal domestic preferences (or exclusions
of foreign goods) will apply to purchases in the
new marketplaces. As a result, GSA’s solicitation notes that users of the new marketplaces
“may consider”—but apparently are not bound
by—an item’s country of origin. The practical
effect may be striking: for example, users may
be able to buy Chinese goods directly through
the new electronic marketplaces, though
Chinese goods traditionally would have faced
severe price discrimination under the Buy
American Act, and could have been barred
entirely under larger procurements by the
Trade Agreements Act (since China has not yet
joined a trade agreement covering procurement
trade with the United States). See Yukins and
Green, International Trade Agreements and
U.S. Procurement Law (2018), ch. 9 to The Contractor’s Guide to International Procurement
(ABA 2018) (Erin Loraine Felix & Marques
Peterson, eds.), draft available at ssrn.com/
abstract=3443244.
Security Review, But Without Published Standards: Much as the lack of acquisition planning in the new electronic marketplaces may
impede socio-economic goals, so too may the
Government’s acute security concerns—the
need to exclude items that pose cybersecurity risks, for example—be exacerbated by the
new marketplaces. GSA’s pending solicitation
excludes a limited list of targeted companies that are considered high-risk, such as
Kaspersky Lab and Huawei. Section E.3.8 of
the solicitation goes a step further, however,
3
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and may make proposals subject to review
and potential rejection by a new interagency
council established under 41 USCA § 1322, the
Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC).
(The FASC only recently held its first meeting.
See Rick Weber, “Federal Acquisition Security
Council, Created Under 2018 Tech Law, Holds
First Meeting,” Inside Defense, May 2, 2019.)
GSA’s final solicitation does not specify what
standards the FASC will apply in rejecting
proposals, however, which raises serious questions under the FAR, see, e.g., FAR 15.203, and
indeed under basic international norms for
anti-corruption, see UN Convention Against
Corruption, Art. 9.1(c) (parties are to ensure
the “use of objective and predetermined criteria for public procurement decisions, in order
to facilitate the subsequent verification of the
correct application of the rules or procedures”).
While the Government may argue that its
national security determinations should enjoy
deference, recent controversies surrounding
the Trump Administration’s alleged conflations of private, political and national security
interests may mean that less deference will be
afforded here. The FASC review of proposals
under GSA’s final solicitation—a review which
apparently will focus on proposals at contract
inception—also may divert attention from an
ongoing risk during contract administration
that dangerous goods and suppliers may be
added to the electronic marketplaces after
contracts are awarded. Although GSA’s final
solicitation warns that the new electronic marketplaces “shall employ effective supply chain
risk management processes and controls,” see
SOO § 4.B, the electronic marketplaces will
be allowed to follow their normal commercial
practices for “on-boarding” new vendors—
standard practices which some may argue do
not screen adequately for security risks to the
Government.
No Clear Pathway to Protest: Those seeking to
stop protests (challenges) to purchases under
the new contracts may argue that the new
contracts are indefinite-delivery, indefinitequantity (IDIQ contracts, sometimes known
as “framework agreements” or catalogue contracts), and so purchases under the new contracts (since below the monetary thresholds
for task-order protests) are not protestable
per FAR 16.505(a)(10). On the other hand,
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GSA’s final solicitation does not term these
IDIQ contracts and emphasizes in attachment
1 that federal customers, when purchasing
through the new electronic marketplaces, will
be entering into separate contracts—which
suggests that the purchases will not be orders
under IDIQ contracts, and so will not be subject to the task-order protest bar. Resolving
these issues of protestability will be important
going forward, if accountability issues emerge
in purchasing through the electronic marketplaces.
Potential Liability Under the GSA FSS Price
Reduction Clause: GSA’s Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) contracts still often rely on
a most-favored-customer provision, the Price
Reduction clause, GSAR 552.238-81, to ensure
that GSA FSS customers receive reasonable pricing. Under that clause, commercial
sales below the GSA FSS price may violate
the most-favored-customer commitment, and
thus may trigger a price reduction (or even a
fraud action) under the FSS contract. Notably,
§ 4.D of GSA’s final solicitation for electronic
marketplaces warns that “commercial sales
through the e-marketplace could trigger the
Price Reduction Clause based upon the terms
[and] conditions of that individual supplier’s
FSS contract”—a potentially serious concern
for vendors using both the GSA schedules and
the new GSA electronic marketplaces as sales
vehicles. This risk is further complicated by §
B.1 of the GSA solicitation, which says that
“items sold to Government agencies through
the awarded contracts are to be provided at
commercial B2B [business-to-business] pricing
or better”—thus suggesting that the electronic
marketplace pricing is to fall below vendors’
commercial pricing, which in practice (depending on the terms of vendor’s schedules contract)
may trigger the FSS Price Reduction clause.
Vendor Data May Be Misappropriated: Although Congress mandated that data gathered
from federal sales in the electronic marketplaces not be misused, and GSA’s final solicitation
bars misuse of the data, see SOO § 4.C, some
in the vendor community remain concerned
that those running the electronic marketplaces
could in fact capture vendor data regarding
sales on the marketplaces, and use that data to
divert future sales to themselves. The Coalition
for Government Procurement has urged that
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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this is a potential organizational conflict of
interest, and the GSA final solicitation requires
offerors of electronic marketplaces to submit
plans to address this risk—a risk that may
have to be assessed further as the electronic
marketplaces pilot progresses.
Conclusion—GSA’s final solicitation stressed
that awards for the new electronic marketplaces will
be driven by “user experience,” which is a reflection,
in part, of the frustration many federal users have
with traditional procurement methods. While the
new marketplaces promise users flexibility and responsiveness, the electronic marketplaces initiative
is in many ways a radical departure from traditional
contracting—an outsourcing of the procurement
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function without much of the transparency, competition and accountability that normally protect federal
purchasing. Members of the federal procurement
community (and the broader procurement community
around the world) are likely to watch this pilot closely,
to determine whether the efficiency gains outweigh
the significant concerns that surround these new
marketplaces.
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This Feature Comment was written for The Government Contractor by Professor Christopher R.
Yukins of the George Washington University Law
School in Washington, D.C.
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